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Low carbon and environmental sectors are those “contributing to pre-
vent,measure, limit,minimize or correct environmental damage towater,
air and soil, as well as problems related to waste, noise and eco-systems”
and include cleaner production technologies, products and services that
reduce environmental risk and minimise pollution and resource use
(OECD and Eurostat, 1999). Policies to support these sectors are a fre-
quent feature not only of sustainable development policies initiatives
but also growth strategies in countries and regions across the globe. Inno-
vation in these economic sectors is seen as key in resolving the ‘trilemma’
of affordability, security and sustainability of energy supply as well as
maximizing opportunities to grow low carbon economies. However,
stimulating low carbon innovation is invariably complicated, with
multiple facets that require coordination including policies for ener-
gy generation and transmission, pricing, regulation, pollution, land-
use, technology, industry, competition, and regional development
(OECD, 2015).
This paper examines institutional, governance and policy mix issues
arising from the UK's support for innovation in ﬁrms that manufacture
low carbon products, namely those that have environmental, low carbon,
or natural resource beneﬁts. Following the 2008 Climate Change Act, the
UK established a path to deliver ambitious low carbon targets by 2050.
Since 2010, this strategy has been set within a context of austerityK, M13 9PL.
arra).
. This is an open access article undermeasures and within a broader ‘rebalancing’ growth agenda seeking to
promote sectoral diversiﬁcation, overcome regional disparities, and en-
sure a more resilient path for economic recovery and sustainable growth
(HM Treasury/BIS, 2011). At the same time, in England such objectives
have been pursued against a backdrop of radical shifts in the governance
of regional policy, with themanagement of innovation policy concentrat-
ed back at thenational level albeitwith some reassignment of limited eco-
nomic development powers in England from the regional to the local
level. Effectively, what has emerged, particularly in England, is a largely
centrally-controlled mix of policies for supporting low-carbon industry
innovationwithweak capabilities to coordinate, let alone vary, those pol-
icies to address regional and local needs andopportunities.We seek to ex-
plore what effect this current ‘place-blind’ approach has on companies
engaged in various low-carbon industry sectors.
The paper draws from document analysis and interviews with man-
agers of manufacturing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in
low-carbon and environmental sectors, as well as policy practitioners
and industry experts. It examines ﬁrms' perception of the policies to
stimulate innovation in low-carbon industries and critically assesses
the governance and institutional setting of UK support to the sector.
The paper draws conclusions in relation to the multi-scalar design and
delivery of these policies, including gaps and tensions in the policy
mix, as well as the importance of, and relative neglect of, regional insti-
tutional entrepreneurship in driving change.
The paper is structured as follows. The ﬁrst part introduces the
rationales for policy intervention to support low carbon innovation
and discusses the conﬁguration of policy instruments as well as thethe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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in turn introduces the UK policies in supporting innovation in for low
carbon and environmental sectors, before providing a critical assess-
ment in terms of the balance, coherence, stability and consistency of
these interventions in section four. The ﬁnal section draws broader con-
clusions and implications.
2. Green innovation policies: a policy mix view
The development and diffusion of low carbon innovation is seen as
indispensable to solve or at least abate an environmental/energy crisis
(Gross and Foxon, 2003) Policy intervention to support emerging
clean technologies is generally justiﬁed on the basis of a double exter-
nality problem (Rennings, 2000), which reduces the incentives for
ﬁrms to invest in them. First, there are negative externalities associated
with unpriced carbon emissions. Second, there are themore general ex-
ternalities and risks associated with innovative activity (given its char-
acteristics of non-rivalry and non-excludability). These market failures
are used to justify the use of innovation policies to reduce technology
costs, in coordination with environmental policies directed at internal-
izing external costs associated with less sustainable technologies.
Besides market failures, clean technologies often face multiple sys-
temic and institutional failures (Bleda and del Río, 2013; Foxon et al.,
2005; Rip and Kemp, 1998; Unruh, 2000), including barriers to adop-
tion, switching costs, and insufﬁcient network effects, and thus their
adoption requires organizational and institutional change. A challenge
is thus how to avoid carbon lock-in (Unruh, 2000) and facilitate transi-
tions towards more sustainable ‘regimes’ (Geels, 2002; Markard et al.,
2012; Smith et al., 2010) bynurturing and scalingup alternative techno-
logical niches that are not yet sufﬁciently competitive or proven.
Sustainability transitions are institutionally but also geographically
embedded (Truffer and Coenen, 2012). The role of ‘place’ has been in-
creasingly acknowledged, particularly in the light of contemporary pro-
cesses of devolution of technology and innovation policy to the city and
regional levels, increased support to ‘green’ regional clusters and the ac-
tive shaping of technological transitions by local actors (Cooke, 2010;
Hodson and Marvin, 2009; Morgan, 2013; Dawley, 2014; Fornahl
et al., 2012; Gee and Uyarra, 2013). Scale and place have been identiﬁed
as key vectors shaping processes of industry emergence and diversiﬁca-
tion (Boschma and Frenken, 2011), including the transfer of knowledge
between related sectors that may eventually enable the emergence of
new, cleaner, industries.
Government intervention to support low carbon and environmental
innovation is therefore broad encompassing, involving several policy
domains (environmental, technology, industrial policy) and different
levels of government. Relevant policy instruments also differ according
to their rationale and orientation e.g. demand-pull, technology push or
systemic instruments (e.g. Rennings, 2000), type (direct and indirect ﬁ-
nancial support or non-ﬁnancial, softer forms of support) and target
group (e.g. whether it provides cross-sectoral ‘neutral’ support or
supports speciﬁc technologies or sectors) (OECD, 2014). Del Río
and Bleda (2012) for instance differentiate between support for
R&D and support for market deployment, including feed-in tariffs
(FITs), quotas with tradable green certiﬁcates (TGCs) and bidding/
tendering schemes. While both kinds of instruments have been
found to be important for driving innovation in environmental tech-
nologies, demand-pull and ‘technology-neutral’ instruments tend to
favour the deployment of mature technologies and are considered
more appropriate for later stages of the innovation process
(Costantini et al., 2015; Hoppmann et al., 2013; Del Río and Bleda,
2012). Del Río and Bleda (2012) therefore suggest the need for a
combination of supply-push and demand-pull instruments com-
bined with the use of technology speciﬁc support.
Besides the choice of instruments, other key factors inﬂuencing
the effectiveness of intervention include speciﬁc design features (e.g.
duration and level of support, target group), modes of implementation(including enforcement), policy styles and actor constellations, and
how these work together in a ‘mix’ (Del Río, 2009; Flanagan et al.,
2011; Rennings, 2000). The level and duration of support of ﬁnancial in-
centives is an important aspect inﬂuencing investment decisions byﬁrms,
particularly at the early stages of the technology. The stringency of partic-
ular instruments has also been found to positively impact innovation and
export performance (Costantini and Crespi, 2008; Porter and van der
Linde, 1995). In addition, a high degree of stability and predictability in
an instrument's direction, rules, and timing (Rogge et al., 2011) can
contribute to reducing uncertainty and secure ﬁrms long-term deci-
sion to invest in R&D. According to Norberg-Bohm (1999), reducing
uncertainty needs to be accompanied by certain ﬂexibility in meet-
ing environmental policy goals. Del Río (2009) further adds that ﬂex-
ibility helps long-term compliance by stimulating a wide range of
technological solutions.
Innovation system views have also suggested that policies should
focus on addressing systemic failures or gaps, and ensure the support
of system ‘functions’ such as market formation, knowledge develop-
ment and entrepreneurial experimentation (Bergek et al., 2008) via
appropriate and integrated sets of instruments. System failures or
gaps in the support for renewable energy technologies have been
identiﬁed particularly at the intermediate stages of the innovation
chain (after the demonstration stage), preventing their successful
commercialisation (Foxon et al., 2005; Ghosh and Nanda, 2010;
Grubb, 2004).
However, these approaches are more concerned with whether the
policy mix is balanced or comprehensive (in terms of sufﬁciently ad-
dressing key system functions or addressing particular gaps) than
with the coherence of the resulting policymix. Furthermore, they rarely
consider the temporal footprint of policymixes and tend to overlook the
multi-scalar and cross-country inﬂuences on system changes by
adopting a narrow national focus (Binz et al., 2014; Flanagan et al.,
2011; Quitzow, 2015.).
Policy instruments generally come in ‘mixes’, with the conse-
quent need to pay attention to potential interactions, conﬂicts and
tensions between goals, rationales, instruments and implementation
approaches of different instrument at different levels and at different
times (Flanagan et al., 2011; Magro and Wilson, 2013). For instance
different instruments from different policy domains or levels of gov-
ernance may target the same groups and either reinforce each other
or cancel each other out. For instance, several studies have identiﬁed
problems arising from interactions between the introduction of
emission trading schemes and public support for electricity from re-
newable energy sources, such as higher costs of compliance and dou-
ble counting of emissions reduction, thus potentially undermining
the objectives of the schemes (Sorrell, 2003; NERA, 2005; Del Río,
2006).
Interactions also occur between domestic and foreign policy ins-
truments, since national regulatory and support frameworks in one
country tend to inﬂuence the sector beyond the country's boundaries
(Quitzow, 2015; Ghosh and Nanda, 2010). Lanjouw and Mody (1996)
for instance found that strict regulations in the US for the vehicle emis-
sion sector contributed to innovation in countries such as Japan and
Germany and Peters et al. (2012) identiﬁedpositive cross country policy
spillovers in the case of photovoltaic energy power.
Paying attention to policy coherence, understood as the presence of
complementarities or synergies (and relative lack of tensions) across
instruments (Howlett and Rayner, 2007; Rayner and Howlett, 2009)
may erroneously lead us to consider that an optimal or coherent mix
is achievable, through e.g. better policy coordination. Policy mixes are
rarely consciously constructed but rather emerge from institutional, po-
litical and cultural decisions that unfold over time (Flanagan et al.,
2011). Attempts to improve coherence can lead to unexpected out-
comes, and overtime dimensions (and particularly actors) in the policy
mix change and inﬂuence policy coherence (or lack thereof) in often
unpredictable ways.
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portance of stability and predictability of policy mixes (Rogge and
Reichardt, 2013). Ghosh and Nanda (2010) allude to tensions resulting
from a frequent mismatch between the periodicity of the policy cycle
and the investment cycle needed to demonstrate commercial viability
of environmental technologies. The producer and consumer challenges
presented by continual shifts in UK renewable energy support schemes
offer a case in point (Foxon et al., 2005). This highlights the importance
of persevering with policy frameworks, avoiding uncertainty and rever-
sals in the early stages of the development of a technology, ensuring reg-
ulatory consistency, and guaranteeing sufﬁcient continuity or ‘joined up’
intervention to enable continuous support along the different stages of
the innovation chain (see also Foxon and Pearson, 2007). Based on the
analysis of the German policy mix for offshore wind energy, Reichardt
and Rogge (2014) note that predictable demand pull instruments played
a key role in the adoption of emerging renewable energy technologies.
Another source of tension can emerge in the policy making process,
where potential misalignments may occur between the policy making
stage and the policy implementation stage (Flanagan et al., 2011;
Rogge and Reichardt, 2013). When a gap exists between policy aspira-
tions and the implementation of appropriate instruments we may
speak of implementation failure or inconsistency in the policy process.
The literature on implementation (for a review see Matland, 1995) in-
deed emphasises the need to pay attention to the target population
and the local service deliverers.
Local policy implementers can play a key role in shaping processes of
industry emergence and diversiﬁcation. Dawley (2014) for instance high-
lights the role of ‘knowledgeable’ local institutional actors in the develop-
ment of offshore wind in the North East of England, using their position
and relationships withinmultiscalar institutional environments to identi-
fy, harness and match regional assets to new market opportunities.
The following sections adopt this policy mix framework to discuss
UK policies for low carbon innovation support. The different elements
of these interventions are considered from the point of view of manu-
facturing small ﬁrms in the low carbon and environmental sectors.
The focus on SMEs is justiﬁed given our interest on industry emergence
and the importance of SMEs in the sector.1 Insights are derived from
document analysis and 35 in-depth interviews. Of these, 23 interviews
are with managers of manufacturing SMEs in renewables and other
low-carbon industries across the UK. The interviews were conducted
betweenApril 2013 and June 2014. Thirteen interviewswere conducted
with policy agencies (key government departments such as the Depart-
ment of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and the Department of En-
ergy and Climate Change (DECC) as well as with delivery support
organisations at regional and national level. The latter group included
the Energy Technologies Institute (ETI), the Carbon Trust, the Offshore
Renewable Energy (ORE) Catapult and other experts with environmen-
tal energy groups and manufacturing associations (see list in Annex 1).
The industries and activities that comprise low carbon and environ-
mental manufacturing, or ‘green goods’ sector, are not straightforward
to deﬁne and therefore identifying ﬁrms in this sector is not a trivial
task. Challenges associated with mapping the sector include limitations
of standard industrial classiﬁcations and other patent based classiﬁca-
tions (Shapira et al., 2014), and the lack of a common deﬁnition of the
sector. A study by Innovas Solutions Ltd. for BIS deﬁned three broad cat-
egories of low carbon and environmental goods and services (LCEGS):
environment (including waste management, recycling, pollution con-
trol, and environmental consultancy); renewable energy (such as geo-
thermal, wind, hydro, and wave energy products and services); and
emerging low carbon (comprising goods and services which reduce1 BIS (2013) estimates that the UK low carbon and environmental goods and services
sector comprises 51, 292 ﬁrms and in 2009 it estimated that small business made up
91.5% of the sector (BIS, 2010). SMEs are therefore “critical to, and a key indicator for,
the present success and future potential of the low carbon economy” (Carbon Trust/Shell,
2013).emissions from transport and construction, nuclear energy, energy
management, carbon capture, and carbon ﬁnance) (BIS, 2013). Follow-
ing this deﬁnition, companieswere drawn froma database of 300 ‘green
goods’ manufacturing SMEs constructed using a search-based identiﬁ-
cation method across a range of sectors (see Shapira et al., 2014 for fur-
ther details on the methodology). The ﬁrms interviewed were mainly
renewable energy equipment companies (5) and manufacturers in en-
vironmental (8) and emerging low carbon (9) sectors. Probes in these
interviews focused particular attention on the extent towhich recent ef-
forts to improve the coherence and consistency of the policy mix are
perceived as effective in unlocking growth opportunities for SMEs.
3. UK support for low carbon and environmental goods
The UK 2008 Climate Change Act established a legally binding target
to reduce the UK's greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80%.2 To drive
progress and set the UK on a pathway towards this target, the Act intro-
duced a system of carbon budgets which provide legally binding limits
on the amount of emissions that may be produced in successive ﬁve-
year periods. The Committee on Climate Change, set up to advise the
Government and recommend the carbon budgets, noted in 2010 that
there was considerable uncertainty about the path from 2020 to 2050,
the technologies required to achieve these targets, and the implications
for technology support (Committee on Climate Change, 2010). DECC's
2011 Carbon Plan in turn stressed that in order to meet the require-
ments of the 2008 Climate Change Act, the UK needed to dramatically
increase energy efﬁciency and to decarbonise electricity through re-
newable and nuclear power as well as the use of carbon capture and
storage. On becoming Prime Minister, David Cameron pledged that his
government would be the “greenest government ever” and UK Plan
for Growth indeed identiﬁed low carbon energy as one of the growth
sectors where the UK should aspire to become a ‘world leader’ (HM
Treasury/BIS 2011).
On the demand side, and in order to decarbonise electricity, large-
scale renewable electricity generation is currently supported by the Re-
newables Obligation (RO), which establishes an obligation on electricity
suppliers to have an increasing proportion of their generation from re-
newable sources (currently 15%). The Government's proposals for elec-
tricity market reform, published in a 2011 White Paper include the
replacement of RO with contracts for difference (CfD), which seek to re-
duce exposure to electricity price volatility by determining a ﬁxed ‘strike
price’ for the different low carbon technologies (nuclear, carbon capture
and storage, onshore and offshore wind).
For smaller scale renewable energy generation, the Renewable Heat
Incentive (RHI) was introduced to provide ﬁnancial incentives to encour-
age the uptake of renewable heat technologies among householders,
communities and businesses. In 2012 the Green Deal was launched to
help improve the energy efﬁciency of UK buildings (both commercial
andprivate). The EnhancedCapital Allowance (ECA) schemeoffers tax re-
lief for investments in energy saving equipment. In parallel, a range of
supply side instruments have been established to directly promote re-
search and technology development in the sector through the provision
of R&D grants, loans, tax credits or venture capital.
Funding for low carbon innovation is disbursed by several govern-
ment departments including the department of Business, Innovation
and Skills (BIS) and the department of Energy and Climate Change
(DECC) andmanaged by a number of bodies responsible for the delivery
of innovation support such as InnovateUK (previously the Technology
Strategy Board or TSB), the Energy Technologies Institute (ETI), the Car-
bon Trust and the newly created Catapult centres. Although not directly
supporting innovation, the UK Trade&Investment (UKTI) supports UK-
based ﬁrms, including low-carbon sectors, in international markets.2 At EU level, the UK has signed up to the European Energy and Climate Policy Package,
which sets targets for 2020 of a 20% reduction in European CO2 emissions, a 20% increase
in energy efﬁciency and 20% of ﬁnal energy to come from renewable sources.
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the Energy Technology Partnership and Scottish Enterprise (SE)
through a range of support programs particularly for the offshore
wind and tidal energy sectors. Since 2010 these funding organizations
are part of the low carbon innovation coordination group (LCICG).
InnovateUK is a non-departmental public body funded and spon-
sored by BIS that mainly funds collaborative R&D projects as well as
other grants previously managed by the Regional Development Agen-
cies (RDAs) such as the Smart awards. It manages the 14 Knowledge
Transfer Networks (KTNs), set up in 2007 to support high growth, tech-
nologically innovative SMEs through networking between business, ac-
ademia, and government. This includes KTNs in the domains of energy
generation and supply, resource efﬁciency and environmental services.
InnovateUK also runs the Small Business Research Initiative (SBRI), a
pre-commercial procurement initiative which includes competitions
for energy efﬁciency solutions. Innovate UK is also responsible for man-
aging the network of Catapult technology centres, created in 2010 with
the objective of bringing conceptualisation and commercialisation clos-
er together. These centres are modelled on the German Fraunhofer net-
work, although arguably lack the autonomy, criticalmass and long-term
funding stability of the German centres.3
The Carbon Trust was set up in 2000 as an independent company
funded by DECCwith a mission to accelerate UK's move to a low carbon
economy through a broad range of activities, such as policy intelligence,
energy audits and support for the commercialisation of low-carbon
technologies, including equity investment in low carbon start-ups.
Since 2010 the range of support provided by the Carbon Trust, particu-
larly the early stage venture capital, has been signiﬁcantly reduced as a
result of budget cuts, and its membership of the LCICG is currently
under review.
At the regional level, and until their closure in 2012, RDAs were re-
sponsible for regeneration, regional competitiveness, inward regional
investment and the development of skills in England. They were also
tasked with promoting sustainable development and support national
climate change targets throughmarket building, supply chain and skills
development.4 All RDAs had a sustainable energy strategy and a number
of them created dedicated renewable energy agencies (Smith, 2007).
RDAs were replaced in 2011 by Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs),
which are locally led, voluntary partnerships between local authorities
and businesses, overseen by the government via BIS. The ability of the
LEPs to respond to the economic challenges tasked with have been
questioned given their limited resources (Bentley and Pugalis, 2013)
and the conditional nature and centrally controlled nature of the
funding available to them. LEPs lack statutory responsibilities or core
funding5 and, unlike RDAs, do not have an explicit requirement to con-
tribute to sustainable development (Scott, 2011).
In recent years, there has been a shift in the political agenda towards
supporting industrial growth, and an associated shift away from
funding small-scale renewable niche technologies and towards large-
scale options like offshorewind farms, carbon capture and storage tech-
nologies, and nuclear power (Kern, 2012).
It is in this context that the Energy Technologies Institute (ETI) was
set up in 2008 as a Limited Liability Partnership between six private3 Nine Catapult centres have been created at the time of writing (cell therapy, connect-
ed digital economy, energy systems, future cities, high value manufacturing, medicines
technologies, offshore renewable energy, precision medicine, satellite applications, and
transport systems).
4 In 2008–09 RDAs provided funding of around £33million for renewable energy tech-
nologies (compared with total central Government funding of £43 million (NAO, 2010)).
5 LEPs can bid for Enterprise Zone status, and into the central government controlled
£3.2 million regional growth fund Following recent high level reviews expressing con-
cerns of excessive centralism (Hesseltine, 2012;Witty, 2013), the government introduced
some timid reforms such as agreeing to pool budgets for LEPs into a Single Local Growth
Fund (SLGF, the use of which is restricted to the areas of transport, housing and skills)
and giving the LEPs some responsibility for deciding upon the expenditure of European
Structural and Investment Funds. The LEPs are expected to develop multi-year economic
plans in order to negotiate their share of the SLGF.sector companies and the UK Government in order to accelerate the
development, demonstration and commercial deployment of energy
technologies and the Green Investment Bank was created to support
large scale infrastructure projects in sectors such as offshore wind.
One key concern of the industrial strategy was building supply
chains in wind energy in the UK (HM Government, 2013), in order to
overcome the dominance of foreign actors and the small supply chain
for local components in the sector (Wieczorek et al., 2015). This includ-
ed efforts to make supply chain opportunities more accessible to ﬁrms
and encourage synergies in related sectors such as oil and gas and de-
fence (HM Government, 2013, p.32). In this context, the government
launched initiatives such as GROW: Offshore wind, in partnership
with Renewable UK and the existing Manufacturing Advisory Service
(MAS), to provide R&D, advisory and capital investment support to po-
tential suppliers. This was complemented by other England-only initia-
tives such as the Advanced Manufacturing Supply Chain Initiative and
the six Centres for Offshore Renewable Engineering (COREs), which
are selected investment hubs across England to support business
growth and showcase opportunities for foreign direct investment for
the offshore wind sector.
A number of commentators have viewed recent industrial policy
efforts with some caution. For instance Bailey and De Propris (2014)
note that, while positive, recent policy efforts to build manufacturing
capacity have been too small scale to restore a hollowed-out
manufacturing base in the UK and have often not reached smaller
ﬁrms. Peck et al. (2013) have expressed concerns about an increased
centralisation and lack of place sensitivity of innovation and industrial
policies following the abolition of regional governance structures in
England.
Building on this overview of recent efforts to develop low carbon
industries in the UK, the following section uses a policy mix framework
to discuss and assess balance, coherence, stability and consistency of
these interventions.
4. UK low carbon innovation support for SMEs: a policy mix view
As described in the previous section, policies to stimulate low carbon
innovation in the UK have involved both environmental regulation and
innovation or technology-speciﬁc policies, including direct support for
R&D, ﬁnancial incentives and market development policies.
A number of analysts have pointed to an imbalance in the UK policy
mix for low carbon innovation, with insufﬁcient attention directed to-
wards supply side instruments and the use of industrial policy to favour
the domestic industry (Spencer and Arwas, 2013; Foxon et al., 2005).
The government's ‘technology neutral’ approach has been criticised
for favouring “tried and tested technologies” which penalises compa-
nies whose technologies are less mature and off the radar. One
interviewed company for instance noted that “[the UK] does not like
to be front runner in the technology race, they like to be close follower
of those companies or countries that are going for technologies in a
big way and push the market place forward” (interview 12).
The commitment of theUKgovernment towards low carbon innova-
tion has been further questioned (see e.g. Mazzucato, 2013) following a
signiﬁcant scaling back in investment in green technologies, including a
signiﬁcant cut in the budget for DECC, and the removal of core funding
for the Carbon Trust. A recent review of low carbon innovation funding
(NAO, 2013) found a signiﬁcant drop (30%) in government spending on
energy research from 2010 to 11 levels.6 Among our interviewees there
was a perception that little progress had been made on the technology
side “where there is a very acute shortage of growth ﬁnance”, compared
to the market pull side (Interview 29).6 UK spending on energy R&D, recorded by the International Energy Agency (IEA), has
also ﬂuctuated signiﬁcantly over the years. It experienced a signiﬁcant drop in the 1980s
coinciding with the privatisation of the energy sector and the discovery of North Sea oil
and gas. It subsequently (since 2001) increased, with a decline in recent years.
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interviewed as the main barrier to growth, due to poor access to bank
funding and limited availability of venture capital funds (particularly
after the Carbon Trust venture capital programme was discontinued).
Venture capital tends to concentrate in areas of high potential growth,
low technological complexity and low capital intensity (Mazzucato,
2013). For instance, the UK Innovation Investment Fund (UKIIF), a
Fund-of-Funds launched in June 2009 by theUKGovernment in support
of high-tech start-ups has had low penetration in low carbon sectors,
particularly high risk, high capital intensive, sectors such as marine re-
newables. While in biotech, pharmaceutical companies actively acquire
biotechnology start-ups and therefore offer a proﬁtable exit strategy,
energy ﬁrms and utilities are far from active in acquiring clean energy
start-ups (Ghosh and Nanda, 2010). As one marine technology compa-
ny put it “you have people developing these technologies who are high-
ly motivated but they go into a market that does not have to buy their
kit”, adding that the sector operates in “a commodity product dominat-
ed by big players who want to maintain the status quo, [and] are not
keen to invest” (interview19). Itwas also felt that theGreen Investment
Bankwas predominantly “for the big boys”, namely big energy intensive
industries and large manufacturers, rather than SMEs (interview 33).
A key general concern is that available grants do not offer sufﬁcient
level of support forcing them to raise additional internal funds. One
company thus stated: “We have done well with competitive govern-
ment funding, and that has been useful. I was a little concerned about
the government's approach of giving funding and then walking away.
In order to support high tech ﬁrms they need to maintain that support.
I would rather have less money but which lasts longer” (interview 17).
Recent efforts to address early stage funding gaps include the Energy
Catalyst fund, a joined-up funding escalator jointly sponsored by BIS,
DECC and the research councils that supports innovation along the in-
novation cycle from research to commercial readiness. In addition, a
new Energy Entrepreneurs Fund provides capital grants up to 100% of
the total cost plus incubation support and advice from organizations
such as the Carbon Trust.
A number of the SMEs interviewed have responded to this funding
gap by seeking ﬁnancing opportunities abroad. The CEO of one low car-
bon company specialised in nano-materials reported how “it was difﬁ-
cult to raise money in the UK that is why we ended up moving to the
US” (interview 17). Some companies have succeeded in doing so,
obtaining abroad the access to funding and/or expertise necessary to
scale up production.Most SMEs however, lacked the resources and abil-
ity to make those links and tap into opportunities overseas.
4.1. Complexity and lack of coherence of funding support
Overall, support for low carbon innovation is complex, characterised
by multiple and sometimes overlapping delivery bodies and modes of
support. Dowling (2015) recently stressed the problematic complexity
of the UK innovation support landscape, which she argued is “partly a
reﬂection of the tendency to create new initiatives without giving sufﬁ-
cient consideration to how these complement or build on existing ini-
tiatives” (p.23). This makes understanding the support available
extremely challenging for ﬁrms. It is, as acknowledged by one support
body, “very hard for a reasonably well-informed outsider to understand
how this [the support landscape] ﬁts together, let alone the small busi-
nesses not familiarwith public policies or public institutions” (interview
29).
As one commentator pointed out, while there is more funding and
support available than people realize (interview 28), their uptake is
constrained by a poor understanding by target ﬁrms of the innovation
support landscape. Many SMEs seem unaware of the new bodies and
initiatives supporting the sector.
One good example is the poor uptake of the Enhanced Capital Allow-
ance (ECA) scheme due to lack of awareness and certain difﬁculties in
the design of the instrument. This is consistent with earlier studies,that found that ﬁrms were either not aware of ECA or failed to take ad-
vantage due to the complexity of the process or lack of relevance of the
allowance (Lea and O'Doherty, 2008). Awareness and uptake of the
GROW:OffshoreWind initiative has also been very low. Despite the rel-
ative ease and speed of the grants application process, GROW ofﬁcials
acknowledged that this was partly to do with unexpected uncertainties
in the market, but mainly due to difﬁculties in advertising the initiative
in an already very crowded landscape.
When the system is so complex, it is harder to achieve coherence,
which can risk continuity of investment efforts by ﬁrms through to de-
ployment. Indeed one SMEmentioned that “a big hindrance to invest in
the UK is that there are so many government departments that are just
not aligned. There needs to be an overarching body that coordinates
what goes on” (interview 18).
Some of thismisalignment is apparent at the level of delivery bodies,
as a result of their different goals and missions. DECC, the Carbon Trust,
InnovateUK, the ETI and the Catapults develop their own activities
based on the policy objectives they are funded to support. So the focus
of InnovateUK is to promote business with innovation and export po-
tential, the Carbon Trust seeks to reduce the carbon content of the ener-
gy system, ETI funds technologies that optimise the UK's energy system
for the lower cost, and the remit of the Offshore Renewable Energy
(ORE) Catapult is to increase UK content of the supply chain through in-
novation. However these organisations recognise that their different
objectives and missions can be an obstacle for working together and
exploiting synergies. They acknowledge that tensions exist between
the policy objectives of carbon reduction, innovation support and pro-
moting growth, and also between promoting innovation and increasing
UK content in the supply chain. While organisations such as the Carbon
Trust and the Catapult centres operate in a similar innovation support
space, they may choose to support different target groups (e.g. innova-
tiveﬁrmswith growth potential vis-à-vis ﬁrms developingmore carbon
reduction technologies, or developing technologies in support to UK
supply chain).
Tensions also manifest in relation to the multi-level nature of envi-
ronmental policies, namely the inﬂuence on investment decisions of
supra-national and cross-national regulatory and funding regimes. The
House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee (2014) re-
ported the risk of DECC not engaging fully (as a result of a lack of staff
resources) on European issues that directly inﬂuence UK innovators,
by for instance informing European Union (EU) funding programmes
or contributing to shape EU standards for low carbon products and
services.
SMEs are also affected by policy developments in other countries,
which inﬂuence the impact of policy instruments at home. Such interac-
tions can be complementary, for instance a water technology company
described how the innovations they developed as a result of strictwater
regulations in the UK led to signiﬁcant overseasmarket opportunities as
these standards diffuse internationally (interview 10). In other cases
however, regulatory differences have led UK SMEs to diversify away
from what they perceive as a more uncertain environment at home
and explore other markets perceived as relatively more favourable
and stable (e.g. Germany).
Efforts to align policy goals and better target support for low carbon
innovation have included the creation of the aforementioned low car-
bon innovation coordination group (LCICG), bringing together the
major public-sector backed funders of low carbon innovation in the
UK. One of the outcomes of the LCIGC is the publication of Technology
Innovation Needs Assessment (TINAs), which aim to identify and quan-
tify the key innovation needs of speciﬁc low carbon technology families
to inform the prioritisation of public sector investment in low carbon
innovation.
Our interviewees felt that these coordination efforts are mainly ‘in-
ternally focused’ and not very visible to SMEs, appearing still “incredibly
fragmented from the outside” (interview 33), and suggested that they
should be “accompanied by a joined strategy for communication, even
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(ibid.) The House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee
(2014) also questioned the LCICG's ‘muddled strategy’, aswell as the ex-
ternal engagement and communication efforts of the group.
In relation to the TINAs, while they “have introduced more rigour
and a shared approach” to assessing priorities for support, they are
still “limited as a source of quantitative evidence for prioritisation be-
tween technologies” (NAO, 2013, p.27). Concerns include a lack of com-
parable methodology that enables the performance of the different
sectors to be compared with each other and a lack of a broad, systemic
view that incorporates broader issues such as barriers to adoption aris-
ing from the planning system, the supply chain, related infrastructure,
andﬁnance. Itwas for instance suggested that,while TINAs help address
what areas of technology the UK can focus on, their interconnection are
not addressed, “you can look at these technologies but there has to be a
road map of what the government can do across all of them. How does
spending on hydrogen compare with wind for instance?” (interview
25).
4.2. Stability of support frameworks
Businesses value long-term stability of support structures and incen-
tive frameworks andmany thus lament the lack of continuity and stabil-
ity of the UK regulatory and funding regime for low carbon innovation.
For instance one company argued: “for our particular type of applica-
tion, we haven't had much continuity or stability in terms of those re-
gimes, hence the reason we have no customers in the UK” (interview
13).
Many ﬁrms also lament the UK government's tendency to ‘chop and
change institutions’ and question whether the new low carbon innova-
tion delivery bodies have the funding stability and the critical mass
needed to generate enough industry conﬁdence. The perception is
that each new government is setting up its own institutions, “muddling
through changes rather than having a settled and long-term view of
what innovation institutions they want” (interview 29).
ETI is part-funded by the government for 10 years, however their ac-
tivities have taken some time to gain traction and concerns have been
expressed about a too abrupt end of their activities (Technopolis,
2013). The Catapult centres have core funding for 5 years, after which
the expectation is that public funding will be reduced to approximately
a third of their budget, and the rest will be complemented by private
funding and other sources such as EU funding. It is unclear, particularly
considering the time required to recruit qualiﬁed staff, form teams and
develop appropriate organisational structures, whether this is a sufﬁ-
ciently long span for these organizations to gain legitimacy and become
a credible partner in industry before transitioning to a different funding
model.
It is also questionable whether, stripped of their core funding,
these bodies will continue to address the market failure they were
set up to achieve or will instead transition towards more commer-
cial, more risk-averse model less conducive to support early stage
commercialisation.
Changes in the institutional landscape and priorities, has led some
support actors to reposition their activities and strategies. For instance
Kern (2012, p.308) describes how the Carbon Trust has been “chal-
lenged by the growth of other policy initiatives in this area and is strug-
gling to differentiate itself from and legitimise itself vis-à-vis these
initiatives”. This reshufﬂing has caused existing organisations to gravi-
tate towards a similar support space, away from more risky early
stage support for niche technologies and towards larger scale projects
with industry, aggravating perceived problems of fragmentation and
duplication of support. As one interviewee sharply remarked: “the Cat-
apults are attracting some of the best talentwithin those sectors. Unless
they move very quickly into a commercial model of stimulating other
investment they run the risk of falling into a similar trap of other public
organisations. When themoney runs out they disappear or they start toencroach on the private sector. They become quasi-public quasi-private
and they start to use public money to compete in a commercial market
place, which is not what they were designed to do.” (interview 32).
Compounding the problem of lack of continuity and stability of sup-
port frameworks is the lack of effective efforts to communicate the Gov-
ernment investment priorities. Despite the LCICG's prioritisation efforts,
there appears to be a lack of awareness by ﬁrms of the type of technol-
ogies that the government is championing. The House of Commons
Energy and Climate Change Committee (2014) also reported insuf-
ﬁcient consultation with industry when identifying low carbon sectors
and, more generally, the EEF (2013, p.17) noted that “the system
would beneﬁt from stronger signalling and leadership and greater clar-
ity onwhat type and level of investment and assistance is available from
whom and when”.
Effective communication of government priorities and new funding
opportunities to companies is limited by lack of resources available to
government departments formarketing and communication of their ac-
tivities. As noted by a local director at BIS “our promotional activity has
dieddownquite considerably. It is not seen as essential expenditure, but
then for the uptake of these sort of things, it's important to communi-
cate through various mechanisms”. Another delivery organisation also
lamented that “the government aren't very good in telling people
about the good stuff that they are doing” (interview 30). Recently an
on-line portal (Low-Carbon Funding Landscape Navigator) has been
set up to provide information on innovation funding opportunities
from public and private sectors. However industry knowledge of
the Navigator is still weak (House of Commons Energy and Climate
Change Committee, 2014).
4.3. Local implementation gap
As mentioned earlier, when RDAs were disbanded many policy
levers previously available at the regional level in England were ei-
ther removed or rescaled upwards to the national level (e.g. inward
investment, sector policy, cluster policy, European policy) (Peck
et al., 2013) while some regeneration/economic development func-
tions transitioned to the LEP.
The disappearance of RDAs and related arm's length organisations
has thus left a “missing middle” in delivering government innovation
support. RDAs created formal structures and informal networks, devel-
oped renewable energy strategies and drafted studies to measure and
map low carbon and renewable industries in their area (Essletzbichler,
2012). Their disappearance has meant a loss of sectoral knowledge
and capacity, although some of these regional ‘energy’ civil servants
(Smith, 2007) continue being active in other parts of the low carbon
innovation support landscape. Referring speciﬁcally to offshore re-
newables, one sector expert argued that “it was so short sighted
what happened to RDAs in terms of offshore wind. There was a fan-
tastic amount of people with a lot of good contacts, knowledge and
programmes which just went” (interview 31). By contrast, LEPs are
“very limited in their resources, they may have a bit of resources
and people from different local authorities, but they don't have lots
of experts in say carbon capture and storage. [.] The expectations
from them in this space are quite limited; they are not going to be
able to take it too far” (interview 31).
The perception by ﬁrms of the value of English RDAs in supporting
the sector is mixed. A number of the ﬁrms interviewed acknowledged
receiving support from the RDAs, mainly in the form of smart awards,
which helped kick start some of the companies. By contrast, other com-
panies, mainly export oriented ones, did not see RDAs as very valuable
(and instead relied substantially on the services provided by UKTI).
However, multiple companies accepted the importance of RDA invest-
ments to support certain clusters, for instance the development of the
‘wave hub’ in the SouthWest of England, as a key catalyst to their activ-
ities. Overall, ﬁrms recognised the value of having a regional or local in-
novation support agency. For instance one company noted that RDAs
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tain activities and investments that certainly don't get done in London.
There is no one we can go to regionally and unfortunately when it
comes to growing businesses like this there is a need to invest a lot in
capital, manufacturing plants, recruit people” (interview 9).
While many of the innovation funding bodies have presence in the
regions, their local engagement is patchy. A DECC ofﬁcial noted that “it
is not a priority for us to engagewith the LEPs” and another interviewee
pointed out that many of the LEPs are “desperately trying to develop in-
novation but not really joining up the dots with either TSB, BIS or the
Catapult centres” (interview 32).
Initiatives to overcome this ‘policy vacuum’, particularly in offshore
wind, have included the creation of the Centres for Offshore Renewable
Engineering (COREs). These are partnership between BIS and six key lo-
cations for offshore wind in England, trying to leverage the policy levers
of different departments (e.g. planning, inward investment, innovation,
etc.) to support manufacturing potential and inward investment in six
designated locations (generally assisted areas around ports) with
favourable tax and regulatory conditions. While it relies on localities
proposing an initiative and submitting the evidence base, based on the
premise that they “know their local economic geography better” (inter-
view 24), no funding is assigned locally, and their ability to act upon
these issues is still conditional on decisions at the higher level.
Bodies such as the Catapult centres recognise the difﬁculties of engag-
ing with all the LEPs for the delivery of their services and the need to
prioritise certain areas that are more advanced and proactive such as
Cornwall and Isles of Scilly and the new Anglia LEP or with CORE areas.
Engagement is easier in Scotland, which did not suffer the demise of
RDAs, and maintains infrastructure, sectoral expertise and programmes
and therefore clear channels for engagement with ﬁrms (interview 21
and 31).
There is a perception that this top-down approach to industrial policy
is insufﬁcient to support ﬁrm diversiﬁcation, namely that “civil servant[s]
working in the ofﬁce for renewable energy inWhitehallwill never under-
stand the opportunities and barriers that are presented on the ground in
sufﬁcient detail to help business […]many of these supply chain opportu-
nities are very opaque and very hard for businesses to see. In the past we
had RDAs working quite hard, sometimes quite successfully to make
small businesses aware of big supply chain opportunities” (interview 29).
Post-2010 regional actors that continue to operate in this policy space
are having to redeﬁne their roles and adapt to an altered context and
much depleted resources. In the South West of England, RegenSW
(sustained now through membership fees), conducts active brokering
with ﬁrms to make them aware of opportunities in wave, wind, biomass
or solar, and works with national bodies such as the ORE Catapult to de-
velop a common protocol to engage with supply chains. In the North
East, support organisations such as Orbis Energy are similarly supporting
companies that are trying to diversify into offshore renewables, by mak-
ing them aware of market opportunities, or running joint workshops be-
tween offshore renewables and oil and gas companies. These actors are
trying to re-join and establish new connections by building relationships
with other organisations at several levels of governance. This evidences
the importance of local ‘knowledgeable agents’ and their role in
recombining expertise from existing sectors (Dawley, 2014; Simmie,
2012).
5. Discussion and conclusions
This paper has examined the institutional, governance and policy
mix issues arising from the UK's support for innovation in industries
producing outputs that reduce carbon emissions and conserve environ-
mental resources. It drew on interviews to SME managers as well as
non-for proﬁt environmental organisations, industry organisations
and policy practitioners at different domains and at different levels.
The approach we adopted has limitations. Our focus was exclusively
on SMEs, not the whole universe of ﬁrms active in the ﬁeld, and we hadto be selective with respect to the range of policy areas and instruments
inﬂuencing low carbon sectors we could feasibly examine. In attempting
to present an overview of a complex, multi-dimensional sector, we have
inevitably downplayed its heterogeneous nature and could not examine,
in detail, the issues that are speciﬁc to individual low carbon subsectors.
We acknowledge that our interviews represent a cross-sectional study
rather than a longitudinal panel and that this limits our capacity to ob-
serve the full range of policy mix interactions over time. Future analysis
would beneﬁt from in-depth longitudinal studies as to how ﬁrms navi-
gate policymixes over timeandhowcertain kinds and structures of policy
mix inﬂuence innovation and ﬁrm growth.
These limitations notwithstanding, the paper adds to the debate
about low carbon policies in the UK by considering not only the chal-
lenges associated with multi-instrument design but also the multi-
scalar customisation and implementation of some of these policies.
We have identiﬁed a series of critical institutional, governance and pol-
icy mix issues arising from the UK's approach to support for innovation
in environmental and low carbon industries. By using the policy mix
conceptual device, we were able to discuss the perception of ﬁrms and
other stakeholders in relation to the policy objectives, processes and di-
mensions such as governance, actors, technologies, innovation stages,
supply chains and geography. We observed that the political agenda
and priorities in the UK support low carbon innovation have shifted
over the years, away from an exclusive focus on climate change agenda
and towards supporting industrial growth, abetted by the creation of
new support mechanisms and organisations. Policy rationales and
goals tend to accrete in layers, if only because new policy ideas are im-
plemented in a landscape conditioned by older ones (Laranja et al.,
2008). As a result of an increasingly crowded policy landscape, concerns
emerge in relation to the coherence and consistency of the policy mix.
Recent initiatives such as the development of the TINAs and the energy
catalyst fund suggest efforts to achieve greater comprehensiveness of
support across different stages of the innovation chain aswell as greater
focus on particular strategic technologies. It also demonstrates a degree
of ﬂexibility, adapting to gaps in funding along the innovation life cycle
and changing needs.
There is, however, amismatch between government efforts in terms
of coordination, focus, continuity of support and supply chain develop-
ment, and the perception of ﬁrms in terms of the effectiveness of such
intervention in unlocking growth opportunities in the sector. Interviews
revealed the importance of stability, communication and credibility in
stimulating innovation activities. The constant changes and recent pol-
icy reversals in support to the sector are failing to provide a consistent
and stable environment. Lack of a strong signalling about available assis-
tance and clarity of priorities hampers private investment. As noted by
an interviewee, “I don't think there is really a gap out there in terms of
funding, what we need is more clarity of thought” (interview 32).
Finally, our interviews reveal an increasing degree of centralisation in
policy, and a ‘missing space’ between the national level of policy and the
local level. The limitations of the top-down approach to innovation and
industrial renewal are particularly apparent in off-shore renewables.
The UK renewable energy policy has tended to be technology speciﬁc
rather than region-speciﬁc (Dawley, 2014; Essletzbichler, 2012). The
RDAswere a counter-balance by playing a pivotal role in supporting clus-
ters and supply chains and facilitating informal networks of ‘knowledge-
able agents’ supporting innovation and ﬁrm diversiﬁcation. With their
demise, numerous stakeholders and multiple agencies at various levels
of governance continue to be involved in low carbon innovation in the
UK. However, coherence and consistency in policy is lacking, which
is creating uncertainty and hampering private sector investment.
Importantly, the loss of regional capacity and anchor institutions is
leaving local (and national) actors tasked with leveraging instru-
ments and connections but with much depleted resources, lacking
a clear mandate, and facing a fragmented intermediary and support
landscape. Potentially, the devolution of power and ﬁnancial re-
sources to city-regions now just getting under way in some English
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policy and economic rebalancing. However, the current centraliza-
tion of control and the lack of regional and local capability to coordi-
nate, complement, and customise policies is reducing the net
effectiveness of UK policies aimed at fostering innovation and
unlocking growth opportunities in low carbon sectors.Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research
Council [grant number ES/J008303/1]. We greatly appreciate the time
andparticipation of those interviewed as part of the study.We acknowl-
edge Evgeny Klochikhin and Oliver Shackleton for their help in arrang-
ing the interviews. The authors also appreciate valuable comments
provided by Lars Coenen, Kieron Flanagan, Cristian Matti, and anony-
mous reviewers, as well as feedback from session participants at the
2014 Regional Innovation Policies Conference in Stavanger and the
2015 American Association of Geographers Conference in Chicago. The
ﬁndings and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the
authors and should not be attributed to the sponsor or individuals
interviewed.Annex 1
list of interviews⁎
Company interviews by category (with industrial sector and location)
1 Environmental (Noise and vibration control, Northwest England)
2 Environmental (Pollution control, Northwest England)
3 Environmental (Environmental monitoring, Southwest England)
4 Environmental (Environmental monitoring, London)
5 Environmental (Marine pollution control, West Midlands)
6 Environmental (Waste management, Northwest England)
7 Environmental (Water treatment, West Midlands)
8 Environmental (Recovery and recycling, Southwest England)
9 Low carbon (Energy management, Northwest England)
10 Low carbon (Additional energy sources, Southwest England)
11 Low carbon (Alternative fuels, London)
12 Low carbon (Alternative fuels, Southeast England)
13 Low carbon (Alternative fuels/vehicles, Southwest England)
14 Low carbon (Alternative fuels/vehicles, Southwest England)
15 Low carbon (Alternative fuels/vehicles, West Midlands)
16 Low carbon (Building technologies, Northwest England)
17 Low carbon (Building technologies, Southwest England)
18 Renewable (Biomass, Northwest England)
19 Renewable (Wave and tidal, Northeast England)
20 Renewable (Wind, Southeast England)
21 Renewable (Wind, Southwest, England)
22 Renewable (Wind, Scotland)
23 Renewable (Wind, Northeast England)
Policy agencies, intermediaries, and support organizations
24 Business, Innovation and Skills Northwest (BIS Northwest)
25 Carbon Trust
26 Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS)
27 Department of Energy & Climate Change (DECC)
28 Energy Technologies Institute (ETI)
29 Green Alliance
30 GROW: Offshore Wind
31 Offshore Renewable Energy (ORE) Catapult
32 Orbis Energy
33 The Manufacturers' Alliance (EEF)
34 UK Trade & Investment (UKTI)
35 Wavehub
⁎ Interviews conducted between April 2013 and June 2014.References
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